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#### PREFACE

This bibliography provides selective annotations of open-source material and covers the following topics:

- modernization of the North Korean Army,
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics in the Korean War, and
- North Korean Army strategy and tactics since the Korean War.

The bibliography incorporates serials and monographs received in the previous month and is part of a continuing series on the above subjects.

Entries are arranged alphabetically by author or title. Library of Congress call numbers, where appropriate, are included to facilitate the recovery of works cited.

#### GLOSSARY

CPLA Chinese People's Liberation Army

CFC Combined Forces Command (US and ROK)

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)

NKA North Korean Army

NKAF North Korean Air Force

NKN North Korean Navy

KPA Korean People's Army (Comprises NKA, NKAF,

and NKN)

KWP Korean Workers' Party

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

ROKA Republic of Korea Army

ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force

ROKN Republic of Korea Navy 1. MODERNIZATION OF THE NORTH KOREAN MILITARY

Bermudez, Joseph S. Jr. "North Korean Light Infantry Brigades."

<u>Jane's Defence Weekly</u> (London), Vol. 6, No. 19, 15

November 1986, pp. 1176-8. UF530.J35

The organization and training of light infantry brigades and light infantry battalions in the NKA are discussed in this article. It is reported that each light infantry batallion has a personnel strength of 400 including 36 officers and 364 enlisted men. Basic training lasts 12-24 weeks and emphasizes physical fitness, martial arts, infiltration techniques, night combat, methods of intelligence collection and the use of explosives. Unit training is designed to prepare troops for specific unconventional and ranger/commando missions behind enemy lines during wartime. The number of personnel in the NKA assigned to the 24 light infantry brigades and 35 independent light infantry batallions is estimated to be 80,000. An additional 20,000 light infantry personnel are assigned to NKA combined arms brigades.

"Gas Shells for North Korea." <u>Korea Herald</u> (Seoul), 19 November 1986, p. 2.

This article discusses various aspects of North Korean military modernization. North Korea is said to be importing chemical weapons from the Soviet Union. Sarin, a cholinesterase inhibiting nerve gas, is mentioned as one of the toxic agents in North Korea's chemical weapon inventory. The primary source for this information is reported to be a 15 November article in the Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun. North Korea is believed to have about 50 MiG-23/FLOGGER fighter aircraft and an unknown number of SA-3 surface-to-air missiles.

"Kumgang Dam Project Raising Uproar Abroad." Korea Herald (Seoul), 11 November 1986, p. 3.

In the past month the <u>Korea Herald</u> has published a number of articles critical of North Korea's Kumgang dam project. South Korean government officials believe that the dam's location just north of the DMZ along a tributary of the Han River has military significance. They maintain that

once the dam is completed the North Koreans will have the capability to flood Seoul and cut lines of communication between the South Korean capital and ROKA units located north of the Han River. This article discusses Pyongyang's poor economic situation and questions whether North Korea needs the electricity the dam will be used to generate. It is suggested that North Korea can meet its energy needs with existing facilities. The North Korean regime is criticized for wasting money on unnecessary monuments and underground military complexes. It is speculated that power from the dam will be used to supply to underground military complexes in South Hwanghae Province.

Motoyoshi, Kin. "Armed Forces Structure, Make-up Discussed."

<u>Gunji Kenkyu</u> (Tokyo), March-June 1986 (4 issues). In

JPRS-KAR-86-045, 23 October 1986, pp. 1-45.

The four articles written by Kin Motoyoshi provide an in-depth examination of the organization and capabilities of the NKA, NKN, and NKAF. The March article provides an overview of the entire armed forces focusing particularly on how North Korean President Kim Il-song and his son Kim Chong-il monitor and control military activities in North Korea. The April article discusses the NKA. The author notes in a later issue that his information was two-to-three years out of date. The NKA is said to be organized into 8 geographic corps and 7 specialized The latter exercise varying degrees of commands. adminstrative, training, and operational control over naval, air force, missile, artillery, special warfare, mechanized, and capital defense forces. The offensive and defensive capabilities of frontline forces are covered, although information on strategy and tactics is limited. The May article is devoted to the organization and capabilities of the NKN and NKAF. Information on the strategy and tactics used by both these forces is limited, however, there is good coverage of their base structure and defensive systems. The author believes it is highly significant that the first MiG-23/FLOGGER fighter aircraft was delivered to North Korea soon after Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union. The June issue looks at personnel management in the armed forces.

"Pyongyang Builds Four New Airfields Near Demilitarized Zone."

<u>Korea Herald</u> (Seoul), 8 November 1986, p. 1.

The NKAF has 30 bases south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line and has built 4 new airfields in areas close to the DMZ in recent months. This information updates a March 1986 briefing by South Korean Defense Minister Lee Ki-baek during which he reported the North Koreans had completed 2 new airfields in close proximity to the DMZ. The article says that North Korea now has 46 MiG-23/FLOGGER fighter aircraft. All of these aircraft have been received from the Soviet Union over the past two years. Unnamed officials of the US-ROK Combined Forces Command released this informatin during a 7 November briefing for 60 South Korean dignitaries.

2.	KOREAN	STRATEGY			KOREAN	
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Paige, Glenn D. <u>The Korean Decision</u>. New York: The Free Press, 1968. xxv. 394pp. DS919.P33

This book examines the US policymaking process in the 7-day period from 24 to 30 June 1950. It looks at when various officials in Korea, Japan, and Washington learned about the North Korean invasion of South Korea. In the first two days it was difficult to sift through intelligence reports and determine the seriousness of the military situation. However, during this time the United States made effective use of the United Nations and, once it was clear this was an all-out invasion, moved quickly to involve US Forces, first in efforts to evacuate Americans in Korea, and second to provide military support to the ROKA. The author believes that US policymakers functioned well under pressure and he views Korea as the turning point in the establishment of a post-World War II strategy on how the United States should deal with crises involving Communist nations. The information he provides on how little was known in the field and in Washington about the strength and objectives of the NKA at the time of the invasion is particularly useful. This account emphasizes how important accurate and timely intelligence reporting is to the policymakers.

Thomas, R. C. W. <u>The War in Korea</u>. Aldershot, UK: Gale and Polden, Ltd., 1954. 119 pp. Maps. Illustrations. DS918.T53

Chapter 3 describes NKA and CPLA organization and tactics. It is noted that most of the personnel of the NKA who participated in the initial invasion of South Korea in June 1950 were veterans of the Soviet and Chinese armies. These soldiers were not only tough, but fought with a complete disregard for human life. When the CPLA entered the war, it depended more on the toughness of its soldiers than on the use of artillery and armor. The author credits the early victories of the Chinese over United Nation Forces to the mental attitude of infantry soldiers who were used to the hardships of war and loyal to the cause. Chapters 4 to 12 describe many of the key battles of the war. Chapters 16 and 17 discuss how United Nation Forces dealt with the long winters and numerous morale problems. Chapter 18 focuses on the activities of

particular branches of the US Army during the Korean War, including the infantry, armor, artillery and engineers.

3.	NORTH	KOREAN	ARMY	STRATEGY	AND	TACTICS	SINCE	THE	KOREAN	WAR
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Burgess, John. "Seoul Sees Unrest in North Korea." <u>Washington</u>
<u>Post</u>, 19 November 1986, pp. A21-22.

This article discusses possible reasons for discontent within the North Korean military in the wake of false reports that North Korean President Kim Il-song was assassinated on 16 November. Apparently, the South Korean government decided to publicize North Korean loudspeaker broadcasts announcing Kim's death because Seoul officials believed them. It is considered plausible that dissident NKA units could have sponsored the DMZ broadcasts to embarrass Kim Il-song. According to the South Koreans, the broadcasts were only heard in one area of the 151-mile DMZ, and lasted for about 18 hours (12:50 p.m. on 16 November to 8:00 a.m. on 17 November). It is speculated that it may have taken Pyongyang this long to regain control of the loudspeaker broadcasts. There were no observations of fighting on the North Korean side of the DMZ during the broadcasts. Additionally, it is reported that North Korean Defense Minister O Chin-u has made few public appearances in recent months and did not accompany President Kim on his October 1986 visit to the Soviet Union. This may indicate that Oh has fallen out of favor with Kim Il-song. According to the South Koreans, his disappearance enhanced the credibility of the loudspeaker broadcasts. Other possible causes of discontent are said to include Pyongyang's recent tilt toward the Soviet Union and its failure to enlist support for a boycott of the 1988 Seoul Olympics.

Chira, Susan. "North Korean Dam Worries the South." New York Times, 30 November 1986, Section 1, p. 3.

High level South Korean government officials are continuing their criticism of North Korea for threatening the security of Seoul by building a large dam just north of the DMZ. According to these officials a sudden release of water from the dam could flood Seoul and submerge roads and railways in much of central South Korea. Defense Minister Lee Ki Baek says that Seoul cannot allow the dam to be completed. However, Lee did not define what actions would be considered should the North Koreans refuse to abort or curtail the size of the dam. Minister of Construction Lee Kyu Hyo says that South Korea could build

a dam of its own capable of catching any flow of water released from the North Korean dam. Lee called his proposal the "peace dam." Minister of Culture and Information Lee Woong Hee claims that by building the dam the North Koreans have commmited "an act of national self-injury." He believes tension is higher now between the two Koreas than at any time since the NKA invaded South Korea in 1950. South Korean military analysts are saying that the North Korean dam is as much of a threat to South Korea as Soviet missiles in Cuba were to the United States in the 1960s.

Choi, Chang-ki. <u>Peace and Stability in Northeast Asia</u>. Seoul: The Korean Institute of International Studies, 1985. vii. 400 pp. DS518.P39

This book is a collection of papers present at the 14th international conference on Korean affairs held in Seoul from 4 to 6 October 1984. There are four topics of discussion: the prospects for the stability of the Korean Peninsula; the influence of the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia; the economic outlook for the region; and the role of the other major powers--the United States, Japan, and China -- in promoting peace and stability. Most of the speakers agreed that tension between the two Koreas will remain a threat to peace for the foreseeable future. most enlightening paper was presented by Professor Hans Ginter Brauch of Stuttgart University. Brauch compares the political-military situations in Korea and Germany. He concludes that an attack by North Korea on South Korea is more likely than an attack by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies on West Germany and other countries in Western Europe. Brauch suggests there is a real danger that a renewed Korean conflict would eventually lead to a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet In order to prevent war, he recommends that the two Koreas be encouraged by the larger powers to negotiate mutual and balanced force reductions.

Fuoku, Zen. "North Korean Army's Ominous Moves." <u>Seikai Shunju</u> (Tokyo), June 1986, pp. 54-55. In JPRS-KAR-86-048, 6 November 1986, pp. 1-4.

This article points to a recent statement by North Korean President Kim Il-song and to South Korean reports on the deployment of 65-percent of the NKA close to the DMZ as possible indicators that North Korea is planning to invade South Korea in the near future. During an 11 March speech welcoming Cuban President Fidel Castro to Pyongyang, President Kim said that his country would not look with indifference on the holding the 24th Olympic Games in Seoul. These Games are scheduled for the summer of 1988. The author mentions South Korea's growing military strength and the fact that much of the NKA's equipment is fast becoming obsolete as additional reasons Pyongyang could be considering military action in the near future. Fuoku cites South Korean Defense Minister Lee Ki-baek as saving that NKA doctrine stresses an all-out offensive designed to achieve victory over US and South Korean forces in about 7 days.

Haberman, Clyde. "Korean Leader Reportedly Seen Greeting Visitor." New York Times, 18 November 1986, p. 6.

This article analyzes the false reports which suggested that North Korean President Kim Il-song was assassinated on 16 November. It is noted that South Korean Government sources and the South Korean press reported on 17 November that the North Korean President had been the victim of a coup staged by Defense Minister O Chin-u. Koreans say that the North Koreans used loadspeakers in the DMZ to broadcast reports of the assassination. Additionally, a US intelligence officer based in Seoul reportedly told a foreign correspondent that he heard a North Korean radio broadcast mention Kim's death on the morning of 16 November. The Japanese news agency Kyodo said that Vietnamese diplomats in Pyongyang had reported to Hanoi that Kim was dead. A spokesman for the US Eighth Army in South Korea observed that everything appeared normal in the 1-mile area of the DMZ that is under US control. Haberman mentions that there have been periodic reports in recent months that North Korean military

officers are dissatisfied with President Kim's plan to transfer power to his son, and he notes that some Chinese and Soviet sources have confirmed these reports. However, he considers the credibility of such reports to be questionable. He points out that it is unlikely that even diplomats from other Communist countries based in Pyongyang could obtain factual information from North Korean leaders concerning opposition to the succession plan.

"Korea (DPRK): USSR Gets Second Port Use." <u>Defense and Foreign</u>
<u>Affairs</u>, (Washington D.C.), Vol. 14, No. 10, October 1986,
p. 1. UAl0.D428

The Japanese news agency Kyodo, citing diplomatic sources in Beijing, says that North Korea has decided to allow Soviet naval vessels to use the port of Nampo for repairs and refuelling.

"Li Xiannian's visit to Pyongyang. Seoul Sinmun, 3 October 1986, p. 2. In JPRS-KAR-86-047, 28 October 1986, pp. 20-21.

An editorial in <u>Seoul Sinmun</u> maintains that while North Korea and China are trying to maintain a semblance of normal relations, the situation is really grim because of Pyongyang's close military cooperation with Moscow. The Chinese are said to be upset over Soviet use of the North Korean port of Nampo and Soviet reconnaissance of China from North Korea. The article notes the irony of Chinese athletes participating in the Asian Games in Seoul at the same time that Chinese President Li Xiannian is visiting Pyongyang. It is considered unlikely that China and the Soviet Union will ever normalize relations to the extent that they will once again be military allies. Additionally, China is seen as being less reluctant to publicly criticize the Soviet military relationship with North Korea.

McBeth, John. "Korean Game-Playing." UFar Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol. 133, No. 41, 9 October 1986, pp. 42-3. HC411.F18

The author implies that it is unlikely that North Korean leaders will decide to invade South Korea before the 1988 Seoul Olympics. This article discusses the unsuccessful efforts of International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Juan Samaranch to produce an agreement between Seoul and Pyongyang allowing the latter to sponsor some Olympic events in exchange for a quarantee that it will discontinue its diplomatic campaign to undermine the holding of the Olympics in South Korea. North Korean propaganda maintains that holding the Olympics in Seoul will perpetuate the division of Korea. McBeth believes that while it is impossible to predict what North Korean leaders will do, it is clear that Pyongyang's efforts to either have the site of the 1988 Olympics changed or to orchestrate a boycott of the event are doomed to failure. Pyongyang has the support of a few Communist and Third World nations in this campaign, but not enough to mount an effective boycott. Additionally, North Korea will only increase its own isolation in the international community if it sponsors terrorism or takes military action against South Korea in the next two years. The author suggests that North Korean leaders will eventually accept a compromise and agree to sponsor a few Olympic events in order to share the prestige that will otherwise go solely to South Korea.